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It is with considerable trepidation that I agreed to address so distinguished a 
gathering of development economists, theoreticians, and practitioners. I was 
enormously honoured  when Professor  Naqvi invited me to make this presentation, 
and at the same time impressed with my own temerity at having accepted. I am not 
an economist; at best, I contribute to the emerging discipline of economic 
anthropology, that subfield of anthropology that some have baptised as the “dismal 
science of the 20th century.” I locate my research within a subfield of that subfield, 
in a specifically development anthropology, making the claim that is still received in 
some quarters with only partial tolerance, that anthropologists–those curious people 
identified in the popular mind with the recovery and study of isolated people, bones, 
and potsherds–have also something useful to add to both the theory and praxis of 
development. 
As a self-conscious field of inquiry, development anthropology dates only 
from the last 20-25 years, though its roots can be found in the late 19th century, 
when scientists working for the United States Bureau of American Ethnology tried 
to understand the Ghost Dance, a great messianic movement that spread rapidly 
among subjugated Native Americans who were forced on to reservations by the 
government and in very large part deprived of the means  of social and economic 
reproduction [Mooney (1965)]. Especially in Britain, a policy-relevant anthropology 
emerged in conjunction with its colonial service [Asad (1973)], and during the 
1940s,  some of the most prominent American anthropologists–including Margaret 
Mead, Geoffrey Gorer, Ruth Benedict, Robert Lowie, Alexander Leighton, and 
Conrad Arensberg–tried to apply an anthropology that had traditionally focused on 
tribal and peasant populations to the understanding of our Russian allies and our 
German and Japanese adversaries during the Second World War. 
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In the early post-war period, in the 1950s and 1960s, some anthropologists 
worked with the United States International Cooperation Agency, the predecessor of 
the Agency for International Development, especially in Latin America [Doughty 
(1968); Dobyns et al. (1971)]. According to Allan Hoben (1982), at that time there 
were more anthropologists employed in the foreign aid programme than at any 
American university. But the particular contributions of anthropologists appeared to 
have little saliency when the programme was reorganised in 1961 under President 
Kennedy to deliver and unreservedly econocratic and technocratic approach to 
development [Cernea (1993)], informed by the “modernisation hypothesis” that 
marginalised the people-centred or participatory development with which 
anthropologists were more comfortable [Rostow (1960)]. 
At the same time, the war in Southeast Asia, which the United States assumed 
from the French, seemed to many anthropologists a repudiation of the anti- 
colonialism with which they identified. The involvement of a handful of 
anthropologists in counter-insurgency work in Latin America (code-named Project 
Camelot) and in Thailand was so repulsive to the vast majority of our colleagues that 
there was a general reluctance in the later 1960s and early 1970s to have any 
association with the government. Academia and university-affiliated museums were 
the employers of all but a very small number of social anthropologists. 
A concatenation around 1973 of several independent events identifies that 
year as the initiation of a new involvement of anthropologists with the American 
foreign economic assistance programme. First, there was a rising sense among 
economists, as well as among other social scientists, that there was something 
terribly flawed about the modernisation hypothesis that assumes that 
“underdevelopment” is an evolutionary stage towards “development,” and that the 
time it took to achieve a developed economy could be shortened and the process 
facilitated simply by the transfer of technology, technical expertise, and money. 
Several decades had passed, and while there were a number of countries that 
appeared in some senses to have “graduated” from underdevelopment–such as 
Taiwan and South Korea (two countries that enjoyed enormous capital investments 
from the United States)–and while advances in plant genetics had produced high-
yielding varieties of wheat and rice that some foresaw as presaging a resolution of 
the Malthusian problem, many of the former colonial countries of the world–in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America–had actually lost ground in such indices as per 
capita GNP, rural quality of life, infant mortality and average life expectancy, and 
per capita food production; and in many of these countries there was a widening gap 
between the urban and rural masses and their often minuscule élites. The writings of 
Frank (1969) and others proposed that rather than being linked in an evolutionary 
sequence in which development replaces underdevelopment, the two were 
simultaneous products of the power asymmetries inherent in the global political 
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potentially radical implications, those two bastions of world capitalism, the United 
States Congress and the World Bank, altered their development rhetorics to insist 
that, henceforth, development efforts must focus in the first instance on the 
immediate causes of poverty. In much of the world, this stress on improving the 
conditions of the “poorest of the poor,” with its concern for equity as well as for 
growth, turned attention to rural populations. But other than some agronomists and 
veterinarians, who knew useful things about the rural poor? The development gurus 
in economics, law, and public administration were far more accustomed to working 
with the aggregated data of national accounts than with the nitty gritty, non-
quantitative, imprecise, fuzzy, and often subjective data of individual farms, 
households, and small rural communities. 
Secondly, by 1973 the Western world had become aware of the great drought 
in the African sahel triggered by six continuous years of severely deficit rainfall. The 
immediacy of television, with its graphic images of dead and dying crops, livestock, 
and people, the great migrations of people from rural areas into refugee camps at the 
fringes of African cities, formerly productive farmers and herders transformed into 
mendicants, generated a popular insistence that SOMETHING BE DONE ABOUT 
IT. The Congressional Black Caucus, comprised in those days of a handful of 
African-Americans in the House of Representatives, demanded that the United 
States refocus its foreign aid programme on Africa; and what later came to be called 
the “Development Fund for Africa” was legislated, earmarking a substantial portion 
of the AID budget in support of agriculture, health, education, and population 
programmes on that continent. To the general demand for expertise on rural 
development came the specific need for persons knowledgeable about  rural life in 
Africa, especially in the francophone countries that had borne the brunt of the 
drought.   
Thirdly, the ending of the Vietnam war transformed the idea of government 
service from an anathema to a moral imperative if it could help improve the 
conditions of life of drought-afflicted poor majorities of these countries. Of course, 
the American foreign aid programme continued to be justified in terms of its role in 
the global competition against the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union seemed to 
embrace one country, the USA committed itself either to an armed opposition within 
that state or to its nearest hostile neighbour. There were even in this curious tango 
occasional changes of partners, as when the Soviets took and American-spurned 
Ethiopia and we began a bizarre courtship with Somalia. The demise of the “east-
west” competition has been seized on by those inside and outside the US Congress 
who have long opposed the foreign aid programme, in their drive to reduce or 
eliminate its funding. 
In the early 1970s, there was only a pitifully small number of American 
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was one of them, having done fieldwork in southeastern Niger on nomadic-sedentary 
relationships in a transitional ecological zone during 1967-1969, and again in 1970 
and 1972. In 1974-1975, I was seconded from my University to direct social science 
research on rural development programmes and projects in West Africa. Based in 
Abidjan, our geographic scope extended from Mauritania in the north to Chad in the 
east, and Zaire in the south, including almost every country encompassed within that 
enormous triangle. Most of our activities dealt with pastoral and small farmer 
production systems. Our rhetoric stressed “equity,” “gender,” “appropriate” and 
“capital-savings technology,” and “basic human needs”; ten years later, “environ-
mental sustainability,” “policy-based dialogue,” and “private sector/privatisation” 
were added to the litany–equity, basic human needs, and appropriate technology, 
while they did not entirely disappear, retreated in importance.  
In some senses, it was just as well that anthropology and development had 
enjoyed a ten-to-fifteen year separation from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, 
because it was only towards the end of that period that the discipline experienced “a 
paradigm shift…away from cultural relativism, structuralism, and evolutionism 
towards models informed by political ecology and…political economy” [Horowitz 
(1994:4)]. 
The anthropology of the 1970s was better prepared than its predecessors to 
deal with the dynamism and complexity of rural communities, and with the effects 
on rural systems of the political economies in which they were enmeshed. While 
much earlier anthropology had emphasised the uniqueness of each cultural situation 
and its structural stability, anthropologists trained in the 1960s and 1970s were more 
disposed to see both cross-cultural regularities, allowing for comparison, as well as 
internal heterogeneity, conflict, and creativity leading to social change. The 
ecological perspective in anthropology directed students to explore relations between 
productive technologies and the environment, and the social, economic, political, 
and ideological institutions of society. It also facilitated sectoral studies and 
comparisons…[Horowitz and Painter (1986:2)]. 
I do not want to rehearse further the history of anthropology in 
development, although it has had a florescence that few of us twenty years ago 
would have dared predict in public. As an example, as recently as ten years ago, 
the World Bank, where economists battle lawyers and, occasionally, political 
scientists and public administration specialists for domination, had only a couple 
of direct-hire anthropologists, sociologists, and maybe geographers on the staff. 
Today, there are more than 40 (although how many will remain after the Bank 
completes its 1995 reorganisation and downsizing is uncertain). The niche created 
for anthropologists was clearly a result of the Bank’s belated response to 
environmental issues in development, forced on it largely by non-governmental 
environmental and human rights organisations. Similar pressures have led the 
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Indigenous Peoples, expanding the arena within which its non-economist social 
scientists operate. (Some, both within and outside the Bank, believe that these 
openings have little impact on the Bank’s real business: approving loans. I will 
not pursue that issue here.)  
What I would like to explore with you today is not the history of 
anthropology in development, but rather some of its principal accomplishments and 
its principal challenges as this century and millennium draw to a close. Rather than 
attempt a comprehensive listing, I would like to tell you about some of the actions in 
which my colleagues and I at the Institute for Development Anthropology have been 
and remain personally involved. Carried out in Africa and in Asia, and to a lesser 
extent in Central and South America, these involve river-basin developments 
associated with the construction of high dams and interventions in pastoral 
production systems on arid and semi-arid rangelands, both of which impact on the 
management of natural resources. 
 
DAMS 
The issues of water supply and management have moved to the centre of the 
development agendas in many countries, and older unipurpose or even dual-purpose 
(i.e., irrigation and power) approaches are today subject to intensive examination 
and debate. According to a recent World Bank report [Kirmani and Rangeley (1994: 
vii)]. 
Many developing countries are facing serious problems in meeting the rapidly 
growing water demands for domestic, industrial, irrigation, power, and other uses. 
The marginal cost of additional supplies is increasing, water quality is deteriorating, 
ecology and biodiversity problems are aggravating, and intersectoral conflicts are 
becoming more frequent. These issues are more difficult and often intractable in 
international river basins where riparian countries are unable to establish cooperative 
arrangements to plan and use the available water resources effectively. 
As the major multilateral funding source for river basin development, the 
World Bank has received much criticism from international non-governmental and 
environmental organisations [Majot (1995)] for what some have seen as its reckless 
support for actions that are neither socially, nor economically, nor environmentally 
sustainable, generating a debate within the Bank that has resulted in some 
extraordinarily self-critical internal assessments [World Bank (1994)]. As I have 
written [Horowitz (1994:iv-73-74)]. 
Economic development involving the construction of high dams on tropical 
rivers has become an increasingly contentious area, opposing in often strident language 
conservationists and advocates of indigenous peoples, on the one hand, and some civil 
engineers and development planners, on the other. The contest is clear and 
uncompromising [see “The Debate over Large Dams,” Civil Engineering (August  Michael M. Horowitz  486 
1991)] reflecting zero-sum thinking on both sides. Despite rhetoric acknowledging a 
multiplicity of objectives in dam construction, whose “purposes include providing 
clean and adequate water supplies for drinking and irrigation, flood control, navigation, 
hydroelectric power, fish and wildlife enhancement, recreation and water quality” 
[Veltrop (1992:iii)], those responsible for power generation resist demands of 
downstream users of water in excess of power requirements, irrigation engineers see 
flood-recession agriculture as wasteful, managers of potable water supplies tend to 
have jaundiced views of recreational uses, and so on. Concerns about environmental 
and socioeconomic costs manifested by conservationists and human rights advocates 
are absolutely legitimate, but in their opposition to any dam construction they appear to 
write off also valid demands from the urban and industrial sectors for cheap, reliable 
electricity, and of agronomists for expanded irrigation. Reflecting on the controversy, 
Scudder writes (1989:4): “Taken too far, such concerns will doom millions of low-
income people to worsening poverty with all the accompanying misery. Indeed, such 
concerns may even lead to increasing environmental degradation” (in part as thermal 
and nuclear plants are built instead of hydropower installations).  
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Institute for Development Anthropology 
began a long-term study of population resettlement from the reservoir above the 
Manantali Dam on a major tributary of the Senegal River in Mali. Some ten years 
earlier, in 1972, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal created a Senegal Valley 
Development Authority (OMVS) that was responsible for building the Diama salt-
intrusion barrage some 27 km from the mouth, and the Manantali High Dam about 
1,000 km upriver. Among the objectives of this massive undertaking were the 
generation of hydropower of 800 gigawatt-hours/year, provision of landlocked Mali 
with direct barge access to the sea, and expansion of irrigation. Several years after 
OMVS was organised, the World Bank undertook a survey of the irrigation potential 
of the basin inspired by “a need for rapid increase in food crop production which has 
not kept pace with population growth” [World Bank (1975:I)]. The report concluded 
that because of low rainfall irrigation was the “only viable alternative,” and it 
foresaw an expansion of irrigation from the then current 13,000 ha mostly in the 
delta to more than 400,000 ha within a forty-year period. It acknowledged that “low-
yielding” flood-recession cultivation (FRC) was practised on upto100,000 ha in a 
year of good floods. Most of the river’s waters were seen, however, as “wasted,” 
flowing “unused into the Atlantic Ocean.” The report clearly recommended that FRC 
be continued: 
The irrigation schemes being constructed or under preparation would in part 
develop lands now used for FRC. However, FRC is expected to remain an important 
component in food crops production of the Basin for the foreseeable future. In 
theory it should be possible to improve and possibly expand FRC by upstream 
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of technical questions to be overcome before this potential can be quantified. In the 
meantime, and as a minimum, upstream storage and regulation of river flows would 
have to recognise this established use of flood waters and take measures to at least 
sustain the agricultural benefits presently so generated” (ibid.:22). 
Our focus on the 10,000 Malinke-speaking peoples to be relocated was 
consistent with the general notion that it is this population–and the “hosts” among 
whom they were to be resettled–who are most likely to be adversely affected by 
river-basin development, the so-called “PAPs” (“project-affected people”) of much 
of the South Asian development literature. The World Bank’s guidelines on dam-
affected resettlement refer uniquely to these upstream peoples. It became clear to us 
that among the stakeholders whose lives were likely to be worsened by operation of 
the Manantali Dam were the upwards of a million riparian residents in Senegal and 
Mauritania who lived downstream from the dam-site.
1 Fortunately, we were able to 
gain support from the Government of Senegal and from USAID/Dakar to undertake 
a three-year study of the effects on these people of the river’s new flow regime. We 
initially selected three villages in the middle Valley, and subsequently expanded the 
sample to thirty-two. 
Although the Middle Valley is in a low rainfall area, with an average annual 
precipitation of 250-500 mm, traditionally it is densely populated by smallholders 
who practise diverse production activities, allowing for multiple harvests. During the 
short summer rainy season, millet is grown on the sandy uplands just beyond the 
valley, as well as on some elevated areas, such as the natural levees, within the 
valley. During this season, herds of ruminant livestock (cattle, goats, sheep, and 
some camels) pasture on rainfed grasses even further away from the valley, to limit 
incursions on the cultivated millet fields. When the mature millet is harvested 
approximately 100 days after planting, the animals are then brought onto the cropped 
fields, browsing the fresh millet stalks and manuring the land, while farmers shift 
from the sandy hills to the rich alluvial vertisols of the flood plains, and as the waters 
recede these plains are sown in sorghum, maize, and cowpeas. These have a similar 
maturation period of approximately 100 days, during which there is no rainfall. The 
plants mature drawing on residual soil humidity, sending their roots deeply into the 
ground. Following the recession harvest, livestock descend from the cropped rainfed 
fields, and browse the crop stover and nutritious shrubs and grasses that colonise 
uncultivated sections of the plain. During the period when the plains are inundated, 
some 10,000 fishers move from the main channel of the river onto the land, and the 
combined annual yields from these two habitats exceeded 30,000 tonnes. Immature 
 
1“Least analysed by either academics or those responsible for feasibility studies…are river basin 
residents who are neither relocatees or hosts. Such project-affected people also tend to be left out of the 
type of environmental and socioeconomic development guidelines first pioneered by the World Bank… 
Yet in situation after situation they constitute the majority of those whose living standards are adversely 
affected by river basin development activities” [Scudder (1995); see also Horowitz (1991)]. 
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fish are protected from larger predators on the richly manured soils of he floodplain. 
Thus the traditional production system of the Middle Valley included rainfed 
millet farming; flood-recession (or “spate irrigated”) maize, sorghum, and cowpeas; 
pastoral  livestock raising; and fishing. Since the drought of 1968-1973, a number of 
small “village irrigation perimeters” of less than 50 hectares each have been 
established, and these now add a fifth dimension to the production inventory. These 
perimeters tend to be built on the natural levees, where close proximity to the river 
economises on the costs of pumping. Only rarely are they placed on the floodplain 
itself, in part because of the far more elaborate bunding needed to protect them from 
floods and in part because the floodplain is considered too valuable for recession 
cultivation.  
Despite the World Bank’s early recognition of what would today be called the 
“environmental sustainability” of the pre-dam production system and its ability to 
support large human, livestock, and fish populations, as well as a dense flood 
dependent woodlands and wildlife, and an aquifer dependent on the flood for its 
periodic recharging, irrigation became the almost single focus of donor activity in 
the region. Each of the major multilateral and bilateral funding agencies saw in the 
dams a mechanism whereby the costs of pumping could be reduced by lowering the 
peaks and raising the hollows of annual flows. Everywhere it was assumed that 
flood-dependent production was an archaism that would be replaced by modern 
irrigation schemes. The initial expansion would be in the Delta and Lower Valley, 
where the Diama Dam blocked the upstream movement of saline ocean waters, but 
over time it was assumed that the entire 375,000-400,000 ha lateral plain in 
Mauritania and Senegal (and a small amount in Mali) would be devoted to pump 
schemes. 
Our research team believed that the true benefits of the existing production 
system could be quantified and that the figures would allow for a more realistic 
comparison with the projected costs and benefits of replacing it with irrigation. We 
never challenged the building of the dams themselves, since Diama had already been 
completed and Manantali was well under construction when our fieldwork began. 
We sought rather to test the hypothesis that a management strategy for the dams that 
incorporated an artificial flood allowing for the pre-dam production array to continue 
would provide greater “benefits to local, regional, and national economies…than 
they would be under a water regime that markedly limited the flood to maximise 
hydropower and irrigation. Our research was informed by a desire to see the 
residents of the valley become beneficiaries rather than victims of development, 
while their urban compatriots also profit from more reliable and potentially cheaper 
electricity” [Salem-Murdock and Horowitz (1991:9)]. 
Although the study was directed by anthropologists, there were hydrologists 
on the research team, and they critically re-examined the arguments about the water 
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or  augmented flood (since the point would be to coordinate the release from 
Manantali with the peak flows of the two uncontrolled tributaries that joined the 
mainstream below the dam) would be too costly in terms of power foregone. 
Running computer simulations back to 1904, the hydrologists concluded that, 
contrary to the claims of the consultant engineers, the rate of reservoir recharge 
during the period of the planned release was sufficient to support and augmented 
flood that would enhance smallholder production and environmental sustainability 
without competing for power. In 925 out of the 975 months for which we had flow 
data, waters from the Manantali reservoir could have sustained both 74 megawatts of 
continuous output and provided a flood on at least 50,000 hectares of arable land. 
Our calculations were subsequently supported by the World Bank’s appraisal of the 
energy project, which anticipates a rate of return of more than 15 percent even with 
an artificial flood larger than any we had contemplated. “Tous les 
scenarios…presentent une bonne rentabilite economique…” [Tractebel et al. 
(1991:2-3)].       
The anthropologists task was to compare the economic returns from village 
irrigated perimeters and flood-recession cultivation and to compare the total returns 
from production with and without an artificial flood. Rather than base comparisons 
uniquely on returns per unit land, as is customary in these assessments, we also 
looked at returns per unit labour and per unit capital invested. Our work was 
informed by a World Bank (1987) review of two decades of rural development 
projects. The review indicted these anticipated rates of return based uniquely on land 
yields as inflated, and concluded that the failure to meet these rates was due to 
ignorance of the totality of factors of production.  
In terms of yields per unit land, irrigation clearly outperforms flood recession 
cultivation: irrigation could produce a rice crop worth between $500 and $837 per 
hectare, many times greater than the $57 to $115 from a hectare of flood-recession 
sorghum. Yet the Government of Senegal, which was the monopolist buyer of the 
rice harvest, was losing almost $0.50 per kilogram, because of its assumption of the 
costs of perimeter construction and through subsidising the fuel and other inputs 
required for production [Engelhard (1989:22)]. The structural adjustment 
programme under which Senegal functions today precludes such assumptions and 
subsidies. But even when the government assumed those costs, farmers were ill-
disposed to work the perimeters in years when rainfall was adequate for dryland and 
recession farming. While land yields were high, the labour and capital intensivity of 
irrigation made it unattractive when less costly alternatives were present. In terms of 
yields-per-unit capital consumed in production, rice has a gross output-to-costs ratio 
of only 2.32-3.06:: 1, whereas recession sorghum generated a ratio of 5.61-5.77 : : 1.  
The same advantage holds for labour, with recession farming providing a 
much higher return to labour and thereby contributing to household food stocks 
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While irrigated rice farming consumes labour at 501 to 727 days per hectare, flood-
recession sorghum requires only 23 to 62 days per hectare [Salem-Murdock and 
Horowitz (1991:10)].  
A day’s labour on flood-recession sorghum produced a crop worth between $ 
1.25 and $ 2.50; comparable figures for irrigated rice are between $ 0.81 and $ 1.36. 
The claim that the labour demands of irrigation would slow down the rural exodus in 
the Middle Valley is falsified because the net returns from urban employment, even 
in the informal sector, greatly exceed those from irrigation, and remittances allow 
the family to recover the lost local value of migrant labour. This loss of labour 
power is less critical in rainfed and recession agriculture, since these are also less 
demanding of labour. “The paradox of irrigation is that effective production requires 
both a good deal of liquid capital and a large, stable labour supply, but yields 
relatively poor returns to both” (ibid.). Since irrigation in the middle Senegal valley 
does not retard the pace of young male migration, the increased workload on the 
schemes is disproportionately assumed by women, children, and the elderly; yet 
women have not enjoyed a corresponding increase in autonomy and economic well-
being. By 1978, several years after the first irrigated perimeters were introduced in 
the region, women provided more than half the labour on the schemes, compared 
with about one-third of the labour on recession fields. While they provide more than 
half the labour, women do not enjoy land rights on perimeters, and are rarely 
allowed to have full membership in the water-user associations [Horowitz and 
Salem-Murdock (1993: 323-325)]. 
What are the returns to producers from the other elements of the “traditional” 
system? Fishing is estimated to average 70kg/ha/year. In 1990, local fishers were 
receiving about $ 2.00/kg, or $ 140 per hectare. Adding that to the value of sorghum, 
each hectare yields between $ 196 and $ 276. Termination of the annual flood will 
not only remove the floodplain from the habitat available to fish, adversely affecting 
their continued reproduction, but the run-off from agricultural chemicals used on 
irrigated perimeters would also negatively impact on that reproduction. When the 
enhanced carrying capacity of the floodplain as pasture is calculated in terms of 
increased yields in milk, meat, and calves as compared with rainfed pasture alone, a 
figure of $ 70/hectare is calculated, raising the productive value of the habitat to 
between $ 266 and $ 345/ha. 
We then examined the cost impacts of termination of the flood on woodland 
yields and on aquifer recharge. The latter was fairly straightforward. According to 
the team hydrologist [Hollis (1990 and 1990a)], aquifer recharge is primarily due to 
infiltration of flood waters. Since the villagers tap this aquifer with shallow wells for 
domestic use, livestock, and small gardens hand-watered by women, the drying up of 
these wells, should the flood be terminated, would either force the people to use less 
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through expensive bore holes. Using data from a recent water-supply project in 
Senegal [Horsfield (1988)] we calculated that provisioning 300,000 residents in 
Senegal alone would cost approximately $40,000,000. (We did not attempt to 
estimate the costs along the right bank in Mauritania.) However, there is some 
evidence that, costly as it is, this would prove to be only a short-term solution, since 
both the shallow and the deep aquifers may be connected and their combined 
recharge be dependent on the flood. Furthermore, it is likely that the reduced 
hydrostatic pressure in those aquifers would favour a subsurface migration of saline 
ocean waters, destroying their potability. 
The riverine woodlands are dominated by the acacia nilotica (“gonakié” in 
the local Pulaar, and “sunt” in Arabic), a flood-dependent species. According to a 
Dutch environmental analysis [van Lavieren and van Wetten (1990:24)], the 
sustainable yield of these woodlands is 8.2 m
3/ha/year. The tree is the major source 
both of fuel and construction wood in the region, and there is a vigorous, if illegal, 
export of charcoal to less woodland-endowed areas. We do not have longitudinal 
data on the value of wood nor have we attempted to estimate its importance as 
arboreal pasture and as a refuge area for migrating birds. But these clearly increase 
the per hectare value of the flood-dependent production system that will be 
eliminated if the dams are managed conventionally. 
There is reason to hope that they won’t be. In 1990, the Institute presented its 
findings to the Government of Senegal, and six months later, citing our work, the 
Government amended its Left Bank Master Plan to include a permanent artificial 
flood for the Senegal Valley. While Senegal is only one of the three OMVS member 
countries, and Mali and Mauritania have not agreed to the shift, senior officials from 
OMVS scheduled several days at the Institute in December 1994 to review the 
hydrological, economic, environmental, and social soundness of our proposal. The 
World Bank may condition its financing of the energy component of the Project on 
acceptance of the artificial flood, and it is planning a research project to test 
alternative water management scenarios for the Manantali and Diama dams, not only 
to maintain the natural and agrarian productivity of the downstream environment but 
also to reduce the incidence of such water-borne diseases as malaria and 
schistosomiasis. If our proposal is ultimately adopted, it will be the first instance in 
the developing world in which the waters impounded by a high-power dam will be 
used also for such purposes. And it may provide a model for the management of 
other dam-regulated tropical river systems. 
Evidence from other areas suggests that our approach may well have 
utility beyond the Senegal Valley. In the low rainfall sahelian region of 
northeastern Nigeria, for example, prior to  the completion of the Tiga (1974) 
and Challawa Gorge (1992) irrigation dams, the 5,000 km
2 Hadejia-Jama’ are 
interfluvial floodplain constituted a zone of extraordinary ecological 
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World Conservation Union (IUCN) study, “The economic value of production 
from the wetlands is very large, many times greater than that of all the irrigation 
schemes for which the inflowing waters are dammed, diverted and their waters 
used” [Hollis et al. (1993:7)]. This production, similar to the middle Senegal 
valley, included a seasonal succession of rainfed agriculture between June and 
September, flood-recession cultivation beginning with the drawdown at the end 
of the rainy season, small-scale irrigation in the dry season, fishing, and 
pastoralism. The system was not only sequential, but each element was integrated 
with all the others, such that alterations in any one of them would ramify, often 
adversely, through the others. Thus, herders grazed their stock on the millet 
stalks left after the rainfed harvest, and on sorghum, maize, and rice stover from 
the recession harvest, meanwhile manuring the land for the benefit of both 
farming and fishing. Additionally, the wetlands supported a large avian wildlife, 
contributed to woodland regeneration, and provided for a recharge of the 
subsurface aquifer. 
The construction of irrigation dams on the Hadejia and Jama’ are rivers–
continuing today with building the Kafin Zaki impoundment–does not take land out 
of the floodplain since the large irrigated perimeters are sited considerably upstream. 
But they do compete for water. In an interesting economic analysis of the 
comparative values of irrigated and floodplain  production, the IUCN team asked: 
What are the returns from each 1,000 m
3 of water? The answer is that 
…with an annual water requirement of 15,000 m
3 per ha, the Kano River 
Project is highly intensive in its water use. When expressed in terms of water 
input rather than in hectarage cultivated, current net economic benefits are 
extremely low around Naira 1.10 [$US 0.147] per 10
3 m
3 of water used … 
Net project economic benefits are only Naira 0.02 [$US 0.0027] per 10
3m
3 of 
water input. In comparison, the flood-recession agriculture of the floodplain 
requires substantially less water. Thus, even when the “maximum” annual 
water input to the floodplain of 2549 10
6m
3 is used, net floodplain agricultural 
benefits currently amount to Naira 21.6 [$US 2.88] per 10
3m
3 of river water 
inflow. Total net economic benefits from agriculture, fishing and fuelwood 
amount to Naira 31.8 [$US 4.24] per 10
3m
3 of river water inflow [ibid., 205]. 
Given these data, why did Nigeria divert water from the wetlands where it 
would have generated a return greater than 1500 times that from the irrigated 
schemes? At least part of the answer is that the data were not given; that is, neither 
the planners, nor the implementers, nor the fund-givers asked about the opportunity 
costs in water of replacing traditional production with irrigation. It was simply 
assumed that the advantage lay with the newer rather than with the older system. It 
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The lesson is that the a priori dismissal of an existing production system and 
the assumption that such systems are capable of only marginal improvements at best 
are fraught with danger. The implication is that we need far more collaboration 
among economists, technicians, and anthropologists than is customary today, and 
that this collaboration should start at the very beginning of the planning cycle. Far 
too often, non-economist social scientists, when they are invited to participate, are 
called in at a relatively late stage in the design cycle, frequently after an activity is 
already committed and funded, when their task is to persuade local peoples that the 
changes will indeed prove beneficial. Such merchandising can only add to the 
generally unsatisfactory performance of rural development interventions in 
improving production, producer well-being, and environmental health. 
Let us examine these points in another area, that of development among 
pastoral herders.  
 
COWS 
Whereas river-basin development has engendered a vigorous discussion in 
recent years, and the untrammelled enthusiasm once shown for large impoundments 
and total flood controls is now waning among many major donors–currently, the 
Mekong River Basin constitutes a fiercely contested terrain opposing 
environmentalists and engineers–and dam impacts on people and environments are 
beginning to figure into the discussions, pastoral herding continues to receive the 
almost unanimously hostile press it has since the Tunisian, Ibn Khaldun, took up 
cudgels against the Bedouin in the 14th century: 
…civilisation always collapsed in places where the Arabs took over and 
conquered. When the [Bedouin] pushed through from their homeland to ifriqiyah 
[Tunisia] the Maghrib [today’s Morocco and Algeria]…the flat territory…was 
completely ruined [Ibn Khaldun (1967:304-5)]. 
Compare this with the writings of a 19th Century colonial administrator in the 
Middle East and with two late 20th Century development documents from a major 
UN agency: 
...wherever [the Bedouin] goes, he brings with him ruin, violence, and 
neglect. To call him a “son of the desert” is a misnomer; half the desert owes its 
existence to him… if the military authorities were to…take from them every camel 
and sheep which they possess, they would no longer be able to roam over the 
deserts, but would be compelled to settle down to agricultural pursuits or 
starve…they might thus be tamed and turned into useful members of the community 
[Palmer (1977:297, 299-300)]. 
…caring for nothing, disdaining manual labour, balking at paying taxes, and 
being unwilling to sell their animals [the pastoralists] do not make the economic 
contribution to their countries that is rightfully expected of them [FAO (1973:14)]. Michael M. Horowitz  494 
  [Degradation on rangelands] is basically a problem of the misuse of 
land…[and] much of the problem results from the customs, value systems and 
attitudes of the people concerning grazing lands and livestock, together with the lack 
of government mechanisms for effective control [FAO (1980:56)].
3 
There is a remarkable continuity in these claims, despite the half millennium 
that separates them. It is less important to speculate on the reasons why a medieval 
Arab historian or a Victorian administrator in British Palestine had such antipathy 
for herders than to understand why those sentiments continue to inform the design 
and implementation of the so-called “livestock sector” development projects, which 
include at least some and often all of the following elements: sedentarisation of 
nomads; increased off-take through marketing; shift from a subsistence dairy base to 
a commercial meat base; and privatisation of communal resources of land and water. 
Apart from some commercial dairying and some widespread vaccination campaigns 
that reduced the frequency of contagious epizootic diseases, almost none of the 
projects worked. Degradation was not reversed; productivity was not increased; and 
herder incomes, rather than rising, generally fell [Horowitz (1979, 1986)].  
The reason why these projects failed almost everywhere they were tried is that 
they fundamentally misunderstood the ecology and sociology of pastoral production 
systems. Planners were misled also by anthropology that saw pastoralism, as 
presented by some of the British structuralists, as a special kind of kinship system 
[e.g., Evans-Pritchard (1940)], or, as presented by American cultural 
anthropologists, as some kind of ideological concept [e.g., Herskovits (1953)]. It was 
the environ-mentally and economically informed anthropology of pastoralism that 
emerged in the 1960s and after, with the seminal studies of Fredrik Barth in Iran 
(1961, 1964), that challenged the mythology of pastoralism and provided a basis if 
not for spectacular improvements in pastoral production (at least for interventions 
that would not worsen the already difficult conditions). 
The principal myth that anthropologists confronted was that herders are 
interested in the numbers of their animals but indifferent to their quality. This myth 
appears commonly in the literature, often expressed in terms of herders, looking on 
livestock as symbols of prestige, rather than as productive assets. 
The central thesis of this view is that the objective of each traditional 
pastoralist is to own the largest number of animals, irrespective of their quality or the 
available forage [Montsi (1985:24)]. This objective is seen not as part of an 
investment strategy that seeks to convert the income or increase of the herd into 
other values, but is uniquely a matter of prestige: the larger the herd, the more  
 
 
3FAO (1994:III  5) now acknowledges that “In spite of several decades of experience in range 
resources and utilisation, FAO attention to the social aspects of development in pastoral areas and the 
implication of national policies, whether directly or indirectly affecting pastoralists’ survival strategies, is 
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important is the herder [Nestel et al. (1973:14)]. As evidence for the essential 
irrationality of this practice, development planners claim to have discovered perverse 
or “backward bending” supply curves, in which the number of animals sold varies 
inversely with market prices [cf. Swift (1975:451)]. 
The second myth was that herding was fundamentally anti-conservationist, 
and that herders lived in highly competitive Hobbesian communities. This 
“mainstream” view of pastoralism [Sandford (1983)] received an enormous boost in 
1968, when the bioethicist Garrett Hardin (1968) published his now famous article 
on “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Hardin felt that a recurrent disjunction between 
communal access to land and individual ownership of livestock inevitably results in 
herders’ rapacious competitiveness that degrades the environment, since the benefits 
of over-consumption pertain uniquely to the over-consumer whereas the costs are 
shared by all users of the resource. The article’s appearance in the prestigious 
journal  Science endowed it with an unusual scientific benediction, and Hardin’s 
argument was invoked in countless development documents that saw pastoral 
herders as the principal cause of their own misfortunes, what appeared after the 
sahelian drought as the progressive inability of the rangeland to support the herds. 
Those opposed to communal land use enveloped their arguments in seemingly 
objective and quantifiable notions of “stocking rates” and “carrying capacities,” and 
hundreds of millions of dollars were poured into sedentarisation on ranches, 
feedlots, range  “management” through some kinds of privatisation, pastoral units 
and pastoral associations, imposed stock reductions, new water points, improved 
veterinary medicine, efforts at genetic modifications of livestock, and new markets 
in efforts to achieve what today would be called “environmentally sustainable 
development.” The projects failed in part because they misunderstood the 
environmental and climatic imperatives that made movement, informed by the 
shifting and unpredictable availability of pasture and water, absolutely essential for 
survival. 
The third myth was a claimed egalitarian structure to pastoral societies (which 
curiously seems discrepant with the notion of competition among herders to 
maximise herd numbers), and even the great Fredrik Barth misunderstood the wealth 
hierarchies among Iranian Basseri in his attempt to demonstrate that imperatives of 
labour and livestock forced on the pastoralists a very narrow range of difference in 
herd size, varying only between roughly 60 and 200 adult sheep. 
What anthropologists discovered was that far from being egalitarian, 
internally homogeneous organisations, pastoral societies were internally segmented 
by class, and often age and gender, and these segmentations were becoming 
increasingly prominent as the factors of pastoral production became more and more 
commodified. The ethnographic literature pointed to case after case in which not 
only were livestock being accumulated in the hands of a minority of owners–often 
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also these wealthy owners were able to privatise or limit to themselves access to the 
more productive pastures. Even in such formerly egalitarian communities such as the 
WoDaaBee of Niger, a shepherd class of non-owners emerged after the drought of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, persons whose herds had fallen below the minimum 
to maintain demographic reproduction [White (1984)]. In the past, such individuals 
might reconstitute their herds through borrowing, but the nature of the moral 
community has so shifted that those with animals surplus to their needs are no longer 
willing to loan them. Shepherds work for wages or even for as little as a share in the 
milk produced.  
A fourth myth was that women in pastoral societies are economically 
irrelevant. Here again the early anthropologists have to assume some of the blame, 
because their research rarely explored gender relations of pastoral production and 
reproduction. From a legalistic point of view, this ignorance of women in the 
pastoral economy is understandable, since pastoral women rarely have de jure 
ownership rights over animals. Male dominance is guaranteed by the nearly 
universal gender-discriminatory inheritance rules, rooted, as Gudrun Dahl taught us, 
in androcentric kinship systems that perpetuate men’s economic interests (1987). 
[See also Beck (1980) and Goldstein and Beall (1991).] 
Despite the jural rules of ownership, women’s contributions are essential to 
the viability of nomadic herding. Yet the status of women continues to deteriorate as 
pastoral societies in general have been forced to diversify economically, to lose 
pastoral areas to the expansion of agriculture, urban centres, and even of nature 
preserves and game parks, to experience worsening terms of trade between pastoral 
and agricultural products, and to undergo rapid social differentiation and assaults on 
the moral bases of their communities. 
In 1990, the United Nations Development Fund for Women and the United 
Nations Development Programme invited the Institute for Development 
Anthropology to provide them with a state-of-knowledge report on women in 
herding societies [Horowitz and Jowkar (1992)], in the hope that a gender-sensitive 
approach to pastoral development could be initiated. The research programme was 
informed by the notion that development planners’ ignorance of the economic roles 
of women in pastoral societies–indeed, ignorance of pastoral socioeconomy and 
political ecology in general–contributed to the poor performance of “livestock 
sector” projects in semi-arid and arid regions; a failure stemming “from the 
ensemble of false generalisations held by planners and the faulty methods pursued 
by implementers…” [Bonfiglioli (1992:6)].  
The research found that women’s responsibility for herd management was in 
fact increasing almost everywhere, since the overall deterioration of pastoral 
economies were forcing men to migrate as labourers on irrigated schemes, 
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migration were actually invested in livestock purchases, increasing herd size and 
intensifying the labour demands on women. Yet, echoing the situation of women on 
irrigated perimeters, women were rarely accorded the jural authority such 
management required to be optimally effective. In some regions, Islamic injunctions 
about  purdah constrained women’s abilities to transhume with the herds, when 
household men were absent. 
Despite the mounting importance of women in pastoral production systems, 
development projects continue to be implemented as if women remained 
economically marginal.   
The most pernicious myth about pastoral peoples is the assumption that 
pastoralism–like flood-recession cultivation–represents an archaic adaptation, a 
static system that once may have had economic relevance but one that is no longer 
capable of supporting a population and does not contribute its share to the national 
economy. Far from being static, pastoralism has undergone profound 
transformations in response to its location in the global, as well as regional and 
national, political economy. Control over land, labour, and water is shifting from 
household herd managers to small élites, some of whom come from herding 
communities but many more of whom are absentee herd owners from farming, 
merchant, and civil service/government/military backgrounds who have political 
influence and privileged ties to capital. The vast majority of herders, impoverished 
and politically disprivileged, find themselves with neither enough animals to sustain 
their families nor sufficient access to range and water. There is thus a steady 
movement either out of herding or a shift from herd owner to hired shepherd status. 
Many questions about specific herding communities remain to be answered, 
but we now have the basis for a more informed approach to development that will 
genuinely enhance this form of production, which not only provides a meaningful 
way of life to millions of dryland peoples around the globe but also constitutes a 
remarkably efficient means of converting otherwise unpalatable vegetation into 
meat, dairy products, traction, manure, hides, and wool, that is, into products that 
directly contribute to human survival. Despite the adverse press of the last 500 years 
that accuses pastoralism of parasitism and environmental destructiveness, it is the 
unique production system sustainably adapted to some of the least well-endowed 
areas of the earth.    
 
CONCLUSION 
I have emphasised the work of my colleagues and myself not because it is any 
more profound or useful than that of hundreds of other anthropologists, geographers, 
and rural sociologists concerned with the social, political, and economic 
transformations of agrarian societies in developing countries; but simply because I 
am most familiar with it. I hope that in the process of exposing some of the myths  Michael M. Horowitz  498 
about these agrarian systems, I have also challenged the one that anthropologists are 
adversaries of development, attempting to derail the locomotive of history that is 
bringing us into the 21st century. We do not object to development, but we seek a 
development that in the process of accelerating the transformations that bring these 
rural peoples into the global political economy, also renders them beneficiaries 
rather than victims of the process.  
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